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Abstract. The Suez Canal, that connects the Mediterranean to the Red Sea across the 
Isthmus of Suez, is one of the world’s most critical waterways. Today it represents a 
strategic world’s choke point. Maritime choke points are a major issue today in the 
global economy and in shipments of goods, particularly oil and container.
This paper, using the typical approach of the transport geography, aims to highlight the 
geo-political and geo-economic relevance of the Suez Canal starting from its construc-
tion until its recent expansion. In particular, the paper considers the canal’s impact on 
the Mediterranean’s new centrality in global seaborne trade.
Main freight flows crossing the Suez Canal northbound/southbound underline the 
importance of the Northern Mediterranean and Italian ports that perform gateway 
functions.
The main goal of the paper is to describe, as Panaro suggested (2015), how the new 
infrastructure of the Suez Canal is extremely important for the Northern Italy gate-
way ports in particular focusing on the Genoa port (which is the target of a significant 
share of traffic coming from/directed to Suez).
Keywords: The Suez Canal, freight flows, maritime routes, the Mediterranean Sea, the 
Genoa port.
Riassunto. Il canale di Suez, che collega il Mediterraneo al Mar Rosso attraverso l’i-
stmo di Suez, è una delle vie d’acqua più critica del mondo. Attualmente si configura 
come un passaggio strategico globale. I punti di strozzatura marittimi rappresentano 
una questione di rilievo oggi nell’economia globale e nelle spedizioni di merci, in parti-
colare di petrolio e container.
Questo lavoro, utilizzando l’approccio tipico della geografia dei trasporti, si propone di 
evidenziare la rilevanza geo-politica e geo-economica del Canale di Suez a partire dalla 
sua costruzione fino alla sua recente espansione. In particolare, considera gli effetti del 
canale sulla nuova centralità del Mediterraneo negli scambi marittimi globali.
I principali flussi di merci che attraversano il Canale di Suez in entrambe le direzioni 
sottolineano l’importanza dei porti del Mediterraneo settentrionale e italiani che svol-
gono funzioni di gateway.
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L’obiettivo principale dell’articolo è quello di descrivere, come 
suggerito da Panaro (2015), come la nuova infrastruttura del 
Canale sia decisamente rilevante per i porti di accesso del Nord 
Italia, in particolare concentrandosi su quello di Genova (carat-
terizzato da significativi traffici da/per Suez).
Parole chiave: Canale di Suez, flussi mercantili, rotte marittime, 
Mar Mediterraneo, porto di Genova.
1. Introduction
The current year (2019) marks the 150th anniversary 
of the Suez Canal inauguration: this event represents an 
opportunity for some considerations on the role of this 
waterway.
The paper provides an overview of the emerging 
transport geography of sea freight passing through the 
Suez Canal.
As Ulmann and Mayer (1954, 311) wrote, “transpor-
tation is a measure of the relations between areas and is 
therefore an essential part of geography”.
Yet shifting from “transport” to “transport geog-
raphy”, in literature there are many definitions of what 
transport geography could (or should) do (Dobruszkes 
2012).
Transport geography is a widening field and trans-
port geographers have been working in two major direc-
tions (Hoyle, Knowles 1998; Knowles et al. 2008).
On the one hand, focusing on transport networks, 
facilities and services themselves; on the other hand, 
they have studied the impact of transports on societies, 
economy and environment (Dobruszkes 2012).
In the present work, we have chosen to rely on the 
following definition of transport geography:
Transport geography is a sub-discipline of geography con-
cerned about movements of freight, people and informa-
tion. It seeks to link spatial constraints and attributes with 
the origin, the destination, the extent, the nature and the 
purpose of movements (Rodrigue et al. 2006, 5).
Within this mainstream vision, transport geogra-
phy should analyse the cross interactions between “spac-
es” and “transports”; this is relevant from the local to 
the global level. In other words, transport geographers 
should analyse how the milieu produces and constraints 
transports and how transports affect the milieu they 
serve or they go through (Dobruszkes 2012).
This means that transport geography examines the 
movement of people, goods, and information within or 
across different regions. In other words, it analyses the 
traffic flows that reflect the economic relations and con-
nections between areas (Ulmann, Mayer 1954).
Transport flows are also used as a proxy to “read 
the world” namely to estimate the interactions at differ-
ent geographical scales. The analysis of flows between 
regions implies the use of the so-called network 
approach (Black 2003).
Therefore, it is possible to identify three core dimen-
sions of transport geography: flows, nodes/locations 
and networks (Hesse, Rodrigue 2004). Nevertheless, 
transport geography also studies the different modes of 
transportation such as road, rail, aviation and ships. Of 
course, we focused the attention on maritime transpor-
tation, considered in its last evolutionary step, “trans-in-
dustrial” (Vallega 1997).
It is at the core of the global freight distribution in 
terms of ability to carry goods over long distances and 
at low costs; maritime transportation has become a truly 
global entity with routes that span across hemispheres, 
forwarding raw materials, parts and finished goods 
(Rodrigue, Browne 2008).
The actual configuration of the maritime transport has 
led to the progressive transformation of the harbour spaces 
and their hinterland. Besides, it is important to underline 
the existence of a strong link between infrastructures (like 
canals and ports), international trade, territorial structures 
and geo-political dynamics (Sellari 2013).
For the methodological reasons explained above, 
in the first part of the paper the attention is focused on 
the role of choke points and on the evolution of the Suez 
Canal as a maritime choke point of a global relevance 
(Bencardino, Giordano 2017; Greco, Cresta 2018).
In fact, the paper aims to highlight the geo-political 
and geo-economic relevance of the Suez Canal from its 
construction (1869) until its recent expansion (2015).
Using the methodological approach of transport 
geography, it is possible to underline, first of all, the stra-
tegic importance of the Suez Canal in the global mari-
time trade and its impact on the centrality of the Medi-
terranean Sea.
Then, the second part of the article highlights how 
the freight traffic crossing the Suez Canal can affect the 
Northern Mediterranean ports that are located mainly 
in Northern Italy.
The final goal is to describe how the new infrastruc-
ture of the channel is definitely important for the gate-
way functions of the Northern Italy ports.
In particular, the research is focused on the Genoa 
harbour, considered the gateway port for North-western 
Italy. To this end, the paper analyses its network of com-
mercial connections and the share of freight flows that 
passes through the Suez Canal. 
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The paper aims to stimulate the interest for the sys-
tem of maritime and harbour relations with the Suez 
Canal still understudied at the level of Northern Italy. 
The recent developments of the so-called “Silk Road” 
require further analysis taking into account the rele-
vance of flows along the East-West global trade route 
and the weight of the Northern Italy ports and the 
Genoa one in particular.
2. The strategic role of maritime canals and the history 
of the Suez Canal
The Suez Canal is one of the world’s most critical 
waterways. Connecting the Mediterranean to the Red 
Sea across the Isthmus of Suez, it is an artificial water-
way, being the longest canal in the world without locks. 
Actually, it represents a strategic world’s choke point.
Choke points are a common concept in transport 
geography, as they refer to locations that limit the capac-
ity of circulation and cannot be easily bypassed. This 
implies that any alternative to a choke point involves a 
detour or use of an alternative that implies significant 
costs and delays (Rodrigue 2004). They can represent a 
resource the usefulness of which depends on the char-
acteristics of the flows that cross them. For this reason, 
in order to understand the relevance of choke points, it 
seems necessary to use the typical approach of the geog-
raphy of flows.
Three core concepts thus define a choke point as a 
resource (Lewis 1992, Rodrigue 2004):
• physical characteristics: a choke point is a location 
that forces traffic to converge and, by virtue of its 
physical characteristics (namely depth, width or 
navigability), limits movements;
• usage: the value of a choke point is proportional to 
its degree of usage and the availability of alterna-
tives; representing a limit for the circulation, it will 
be characterised necessarily by a threshold value;
• access: as a valuable resource, some degree of control 
must be established to ensure access to the choke 
point; this requires agreements to regulate use and 
settle disputes if access becomes contested; tolls 
can also be levied if the choke point falls within a 
well-defined jurisdiction to control access to infra-
structures.
Sea transportation, as the dominant purveyor of 
international freight distribution, operates over a global 
maritime space. This space has its own constraints, how-
ever, such as the profile of continental masses.
International shipping lanes are forced to go 
through specific locations such as passages, straits and 
canals. Considering the characteristics of seaborne 
flows, maritime choke points are particularly prevalent 
(Rodrigue 2004).
There are two major types of choke points where 
ships engaged into global and local trades converge: 
natural straits and man made canals. On the one hand, 
straits were given to seafarers by nature. On the other 
hand, artificial waterways, built with or without locks 
according to the local topographical conditions, were 
or will be added to the world-shipping network in order 
to offer other significant shortcuts on interoceanic or 
regional routes (Charlier et al. 2015). With the increase 
of world trade and maritime circulation, many choke 
points have become extremely valuable resources and 
represent some of the most important strategic locations 
in the world (Rodrigue 2004). 
For these reasons, choke points are a prominent 
issue today in the global economy and shipments of 
goods, particularly oil and container. In particular, the 
artificial choke points play a relevant role in seaborne 
trade: they shorten navigation time for freight between 
seaports and contribute to reduce transport costs 
(David, Piala 2016).
The current requirements of sea transport, charac-
terized by a growing traffic and larger ships, challenge 
the maritime canals, highlighting the need for continu-
ous infrastructural improvements. This issue concerns in 
particular the only two interoceanic canals, through the 
Suez and Panama isthmuses, that can be defined “pri-
mary” (Lewis 1992). In this regard, considering the Suez 
Canal, it is appropriate to describe briefly its evolution 
from construction to actual days.
The desire to link the Mediterranean Sea with a 
waterway to the Red Sea is very old indeed. Already for-
ty centuries ago, the Egyptian Pharaohs tried to create 
small canals from a branch of the Nile through the mul-
tiple northern lakes to the Gulf of Suez (IADC 2003). 
Nevertheless, it was necessary to wait until the mid of 
the XIX century for the construction of the Canal. De 
Lesseps won a concession from Pasha Mohammed Saïd 
to exploit the canal, for 99 years from its opening, in 
exchange for 15% of the profits. In 1858 he established 
the “Compagnie Universelle du Canal Maritime de 
Suez” with American, British and French support (IADC 
2003).
The works on the Suez Canal started in 1859. The 
water levels of the two seas (Mediterranean and Red Sea) 
to join were equivalent, so it was possible to realize the 
waterway without locks.
The construction of the canal provoked tensions 
because of geo-political strategies. The British opposed 
the realization, which strengthened French influence in 
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the region located on the route to India. They halted the 
works on several occasions (Arab World Institute 2018). 
On 17th November 1869, Empress Eugénie inaugurated 
the canal.
With the formal opening of the Suez Canal in 1869, 
Egypt became a strategic thus an indispensable link in 
the world trade (Ogen 2008). The opening of the Suez 
Canal marked a turning point in the history of Egypt as 
well as Egypt’s relationship with the Western world. The 
Suez Canal greatly revolutionized the trade route from 
Europe to Asia.
We can say that, immediately after the opening, 
the canal became the focus of Franco-British rival-
ries (Sellari 2013). Disputes continued in the following 
years until 1888 when, in order to settle disputes among 
the world powers, the Convention of Constantinople 
affirmed the neutrality of the canal, declaring it “free of 
commerce or of war, without distinction of flag” (Arab 
World Institute 2018).
This situation of conflict (between the British who 
wanted to maintain the control over the canal and the 
French that had geopolitical interests in the area), in 
spite of some agreements and treaties, lasted until the 
independence of Egypt (1953) and the Suez Canal’s 
nationalization (1956) which decreed the end of the for-
eign presence. From the late 1940s through the 1970s, 
wars in the Middle East made its use more difficult. The 
Suez Canal was closed twice because of two conflicts: 
Suez Crisis (1956-1957 with the nationalization of the 
Canal) and Six Day War with Israel (1967-1975). During 
this second period, the longer route around the Cape of 
Good Hope was resumed. After several interventions by 
the United Nations, finally in 1975 the canal waters were 
once again cleared and opened to all nations (IADC 
2003).
3. The Suez Canal’s expansions and recent doubling
As mentioned above, the Suez waterway permanent-
ly transformed international shipping by allowing vessels 
to skip the transit around the southern tip of Africa.
When the canal opened, it was 164 km long, 58 
meters wide (minimum) and with a depth of 8 meters. 
Consequently, there was almost immediately a need to 
broaden and deepen the canal and in 1875 the work was 
therefore begun. Partially this is the result of the expan-
sion in shipbuilding (IADC 2003).
In 1956, the Suez Canal was 175 km long, the width 
was 60 meters (at 11m depth) and the water depth was 
14 meters. After the nationalization, Nasser decided to 
improve the infrastructure and so in 1967 (before the 
war with Israel) the width increases to 89 meters and the 
depth to 15,5 meters, which made the canal suitable for 
ships up to 70.000 tons (Suez Canal Authority 2017).
Once re-opened (1975), the efforts to improve the 
canal were re-energised. The first phase of development 
works started in 1975 and ended on 16th December 
1980. It represented a big move on the way forward, con-
cerning the canal dimensions and revenues (Suez Canal 
Authority 2017).
During the nineties, other works of improvement 
allowed the increase of canal’s length, depth (22,5 m) 
and width and consequently the tonnage of vessels in 
transit.
Further interventions of strengthening at the begin-
ning of the Millennium extended the overall length (that 
reached 193 km), the bypass areas, the width (225m at 
11m depth) and the maximum depth (24 m) of the 
Canal that, in 2010, reached the ability to accommo-
date ships weighing 240.000 tons. Over the years, with 
the increase in the quantities transported by sea, larger 
vessels have been built; the various canal expansion pro-
grams are derived from the need to accommodate these 
bigger ships (Cresta 2017). The channel has demonstrat-
ed a good ability to adapt to the needs arising from 
changes in the construction of ships (Cresta 2017).
Anyway, the biggest challenge begins after the 2010. 
The Canal was not wide enough to allow two-way pas-
sages of ships, although there were several passing bays 
and areas where ships may pass each other in the Bitter 
Lakes and between Qantarah and Ismailia (Fig. 1).
The Suez Canal has enjoyed increased traffic in 
recent years, with roughly 50 ships passing through 
its waters every day. However, the canal was still ham-
pered by its narrow width and shallow depth, which 
were insufficient to accommodate two-way traffic from 
modern tanker ships (Akhter Hossain 2018). The idea of 
the “New Suez Canal project” dates back to the reign of 
President Sadat, particularly at the end of 1970s (Ken-
awy 2016). However only in 2013 the project of $8,6 bil-
lion expansion started. 
On 5th August 2014, Egyptian President el-Sisi and 
the Suez Canal Authority (SCA) unveiled new plans for 
an additional lane to allow the transit of ships in both 
directions over a greater length of the canal (Fig. 1). 
The execution of the project was scheduled to end in 36 
months, but this duration was tremendously cut short 
to 12 months. The new Suez Canal (completed on 6th 
August 2015) reinforces Egypt’s role as a major hub for 
global commerce.
According to the plan (Fig. 2), the New Canal reach-
es 72 km in length. This includes digging for 35 km with 
a depth of 24 m and a width of 320 m, the deepening 
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and widening of the western bypasses in the Great Bitter 
Lakes area (27 km in length) and the Al-Ballah western 
bypass (10 km in length) (Suez Canal Authority 2017).
The creation of a new canal, parallel to the existing 
one, doubling the longest possible parts of the waterway, 
allows to maximize the benefit from the previous config-
uration in order to facilitate traffic in the two directions 
and to minimize the waiting time for transiting ships. 
This will increase the numerical capacity of the water-
way, anticipating the world trade forecasts (Suez Canal 
Authority 2017).
Due to the potential increase in volume of world 
trade, the choice of Egypt was strategic to shorten both 
the transit and waiting time for vessels, which shall 
result in reducing the cost of the trip, thus attracting 
more ships that use the canal. All this contributes to 
raise the Suez Canal classification and to increase its 
competitiveness along the global East-West maritime 
route (Suez Canal Authority 2017).
In detail, the new infrastructure of the Suez Canal 
allows:
• an average reduction in travel times estimated at 11 
hours per transit in both directions;
• an increase in daily transit capacity up to 97 ships 
(from the previous average of 49);
• no limits to megaships.
Considering the ship size capacity (in terms of ton-
nage), after the enlargement the canal can accommodate Figure 1. The Suez Canal. Source: Smith, Fisher in Encyclopaedia Britannica, 2015.
Figure 2. The Suez Canal’s doubling. Source: United States Geologi-
cal Survey, 2015.
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up to 62% of world tanker fleet, 92% of bulk ships fleet, 
100% of container ships fleet and all other kinds of ships 
(Suez Canal Authority 2017).
Building the second lane was necessary in order to 
increase the capacity of the Suez Canal, especially for 
southbound convoy that had to wait until northbound 
convoy passes through the waterway. The new solution 
cuts the transit time of the southbound vessels from 
18 to 11 hours, thus, reducing their waiting time and 
the total cost of their entire trip (Suez Canal Authority 
2017).
In February 2016, a new 8,5 kilometres long and 
18,5 metres deep access channel was opened, linking 
the East Port Said directly to the Mediterranean Sea. 
This new channel provides a 24-hour access to East Port 
Said, eliminating the need for vessels heading for the 
Suez Canal Container Terminal to wait for up to 8 hours 
between convoys of ships transiting the Suez Canal.
The second lane reduces waiting time for transiting 
ships, facilitates traffic in two directions and increas-
es the numerical capacity of the waterway. The drop in 
waiting times reduces fuel expenditures and costs for 
ship owners, attracting more ships (including mega-car-
go vessels) to the waterway (Van Bemmelen et al. 2016).
The increased predictability in the timeliness of the 
transit in the Suez Canal, the strengthening of local 
transhipment hubs and the choice to avoid increasing 
the Canal’s fares (after the enlargement) will be three 
elements which will contribute to maintain the high lev-
el of Canal’s competitiveness (Baccelli et al. 2015).
The project’s objective was to maintain the strategic 
role of the Canal preserved within the geo-political pan-
orama linked to international trade thus emphasizing 
the importance of Egypt among all major world markets 
(Baccelli et al. 2015).
As the shortest link between the East and the West, 
the Suez Canal is an important international navigation 
canal connecting the Mediterranean Sea at Port Said 
and the Red Sea at Suez, due to its unique geographical 
position (Van Bemmelen et al. 2016).
That is why the New Suez Canal project was initi-
ated so that the importance and the significance of the 
Suez Canal as the biggest and the most important water-
way in the world can be maintained.
It is also essential to note that the project was 
undertaken to carry out the aim of the Egyptian’s gov-
ernment to raise the national economy (Van Bemmelen 
et al. 2016).
In this regard, the so-called “Suez Canal Corridor 
Area Project” (SCZone) plays a fundamental role. It 
represents a huge investment plan (located in the area 
around the Canal, to be completed in 2050) aimed at 
the implementation of a regional development strat-
egy through the expansion of the existing ports, the 
improvement of the logistic facilities and the creation of 
new industrial areas and research centres (Cresta 2017).
4. The world maritime traffic
Now that the evolution of the Suez Canal has been 
described, a brief overview of the characteristics of mar-
itime traffic with its recent development and the flows 
deriving from it is to be introduced.
The aim is to depict the actual seaborne trade sce-
nario in order to better understand the global role of the 
Suez Canal.
As markets became increasingly globalized, shipping 
volumes soared. From the 1950s to the latest global eco-
nomic crisis, the growth rate of international trade has 
been almost consistently twice as big as that of economic 
activity as a whole (Maribus 2010).
The main reason behind the massive increase in 
shipping was the growth in world trade because of the 
redefined global production network.
Maritime shipping covers most of the movement of 
goods over long distances. This will continue to be the 
case in the coming years (ITF 2019). Marine industry is 
an essential link in international trade, with ocean-going 
vessels representing the most efficient, and often the only 
method of transporting large volumes of basic commod-
ities and finished products (Gardiner 1992). We live in a 
global economy that simply could not function if it were 
not for seaborne trade: without maritime shipping, inter-
continental trade would become impossible (IMO 2009). 
Maritime transport has played and continues to play a 
vital role in boosting international trade flows through 
cost reductions and technological improvements.
We can observe that in the last decades ships 
increased in size, became large, fast and highly special-
ized: these innovations have helped to fuel the growth of 
maritime freight traffic. However, an overriding impor-
tance may be attributed to containerization, resulting in 
the greatest transportation revolution of the 20th centu-
ry (Maribus 2010) as an essential element of globaliza-
tion processes (Fremont, Soppè 2005).
Because of the factors described above, the volume 
of maritime traffic increased significantly over the recent 
decades. Fig. 3 shows this trend of rapid growth in sea-
borne trade. The maritime transport volumes grew by 
4% in 2017, the fastest rate since 2012, while 10,7 billion 
tonnes were transported by sea that year.
If all commercial goods are taken into account it is 
clear that there is a relatively small number of princi-
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pal transport routes, and these pass through only a few 
areas of the oceans (Maribus 2010).
As shown in the fig. 4, the geography of mari-
time flows highlights the leading influence of Asia, as 
42% (4,4 billion tonnes) of world maritime trade in 
2017 originated in Asia and 61% (6,5 billion tonnes) 
was destined to the region. Other relevant regions, 
ranked in descending order, were Europe (respectively 
1,8 and 2,1 billion tonnes), the Americas (respectively 
2,3 and 1,4 billion tonnes), with a significant weight 
of Northern America (respectively 0,9 and 0,8 billion 
tonnes). These are the regions mainly involved in sea-
borne trade: consequently, the busiest areas are the 
approaches to the ports of East Asia, Europe and the 
United States (Maribus 2010).
The Suez Canal is a choke point with a central posi-
tion along the East-West trade route that connects the 
Far East ports with those in Europe and North America 
(East coast).
Considering the world maritime trade forecasts and 
the canal’s strategic role, the Egyptian choice to expand 
the channel sounds like removing bottlenecks and rep-
resenting a formidable challenge to the future seaborne 
trade evolution.
5. The Suez Canal traffic and main routes
Considering the evolution of the Suez Canal traffic 
statistics, we can observe that in 1870 the quantity of 
ships passed through the canal reached the number of 
485, in 1950 the number grew to 11.750 ships (82 mil-
lion net tonnage), in 1960 the growth reached 18.750 
ships (185 million net tonnage) while in 1966 the num-
ber amounted to 21.250 ships (274 million net tonnage) 
(Panama Canal Company 1971).
After the canal’s closure in 1967, it was necessary 
to wait until 1980 to reach that level again. Fig. 5 shows 
the evolution of the Suez Canal traffic (in terms of ships 
number and of net tonnage) from 1975 (the year of 
re-opening) until 2018. Nowadays (2018), about 0,98 bil-
lion tons of goods passed through the canal, nearly 9% 
of all global maritime trade (Suez Canal Authority 2019).
Similar to the Panama Canal, the Suez Canal experi-
enced increasing capacity constraints and excessive wait 
times in recent years, which made the expansion project 
necessary. Between 2000 and 2014, the annual amount 
of cargo passing through the Suez Canal increased from 
368 million tons to 822 million tons.
Average wait times for vessels transiting the canal 
were as high as 8 to 11 hours and were often unpre-
dictable. Unpredictable wait times were especially trou-
blesome for container ships, which accounted for more 
than 50% of Suez Canal traffic (Baccelli et al. 2015).
Figure 3. World seaborne trade (selected years). Source: author’s 
elaboration of UNCTAD data, 2018.
Figure 4. World seaborne trade, by region (global share), in 2017. 
Source: UNCTAD, 2018.
Figure 5. Vessels traffic and net tonnage evolution of the Suez 
Canal. Source: Suez Canal Authority, 2019.
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The present paragraph analyses the evolution of 
Canal traffic statistics highlighting the impact of the 
New Suez Canal realization. After the enlargement, traf-
fic through the Canal has increased in double figures 
(SRM, Alex Bank 2018).
In 2014 (the last year before the enlargement), the 
daily average of transits was 47,0 ships and transiting 
net tonnage was 2.637,7 thousand tons. In 2018 the daily 
average of transits increased to 49,8 ships and that of net 
tonnage went up to 3.122,6 thousand tons. 
The impact of the new Suez Canal is clear, in par-
ticular considering the trend of cargo tonnage through 
the lanes: 822 million tons in 2014 that become 983 in 
2018, with an increase by 19,6%. In general, the most 
recent dynamics (2001-2018) of freight traffic (Fig. 6) 
show that the first period (2001-2008) is characterized 
by an increase in the number of ships transited and the 
goods transported (by the same proportion). In the sec-
ond period (2009-2015), it is possible to highlight a new 
tendency: the number of vessels decrease significantly in 
2009 (-19,6% on behalf of 2008 data) and remain almost 
the same until 2014 and, on the other hand, the cargo 
flows increased in a considerable way (+47%).
The reason for this trend can be the impact of 
global economic crisis but also the phenomenon of the 
so-called “naval gigantism”, meaning fewer ships but of 
larger dimensions. In fact, after 2009, the cargo tonnage 
increased in a significant way: +75,8% in 2018.
The last three years (after the inauguration of the new 
Canal) show a similar trend but with a slight increase in 
number of vessels (+7%) due to the enhancements in traf-
fic regulation and the reduction of transit times.
The dynamic shown in fig. 5 seems to confirm this 
trend because of the increase registered in the net ton-
nage (that consider not only the goods transported but 
also the ship net weight). In ten years (2009-2018), net 
tonnage increased by 55,2%.
Besides, it is important to analyse the ships and 
cargo traffic by type. Containerships, tankers and bulk 
carriers are the most common type of vessel passing 
through the Suez Canal. Measured in numbers of ships, 
containerships constitute about 31% of all the vessels and 
transport 55% of goods while oil tankers are respectively 
26% and 18% and bulk carriers percentage is respectively 
21% and 12% (based on 2018 data). The types of vessels 
that will take greater advantage from the new Canal will 
be the containerships (Panaro 2015).
Considering the statistics on the cargo type (Fig. 7), 
it is possible to underline the relevance of containerized 
cargo (that amounts to 53,5% of total cargo ton) and of 
oil and oil products (20,5%): together they account for 
about three quarters of the total traffic in the last decade 
(2009-2018).
In more detail, analysing the different direction 
of cargo typology, the major northbound cargoes con-
sist of (in order of weight) containerized cargo, crude 
petroleum and petroleum products, liquid natural gas, 
oilseeds and vegetable oils, chemicals, coal, fabricated 
metals, fertilizers, machinery and parts, ores and met-
als. Southbound traffic consists of containerized car-
go, crude petroleum and petroleum products, cereals, 
ores and metals, fabricated metals, fertilizers, chemi-
cals, liquid natural gas, coal, oilseeds and vegetable oils, 
machinery and parts.
The nature of traffic has greatly altered during times, 
especially because of the enormous growth in shipments 
of crude oil and petroleum products from the Persian 
Gulf since 1950. In 1913, the oil in northbound traf-
fic amounted to 295.700 metric tons, whereas in 1966 
it amounted to 168.700.000 metric tons. The closure of 
Figure 6. Vessels traffic and cargo tonnage of the Suez Canal (2001-
2018). Source: author’s elaboration of Assoporti and Suez Canal 
Authority data, various years.
Figure 7. The Suez Canal traffic by cargo type (2009-2018). Source: 
author’s elaboration of Suez Canal Authority data, various years.
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the canal from 1967 to 1975 led large oil tankers to use 
the route around the Cape of Good Hope and prompt-
ed the development of the Sumed pipeline from Suez 
to Alexandria, which opened in 1977. Since 1975, the 
increased size of tankers (the largest of which cannot 
use the canal) and the development of sources of crude 
oil in areas outside of the canal route (e.g. Algeria, Lib-
ya, Nigeria, the North Sea and Mexico) have partially 
reduced the canal’s importance in the international oil 
trade (Smith, Fisher 2015).
Anyway, in 2018 the oil and relative products 
amounted to 235.510.000 tons. A more recent feature 
has been the strong growth of containerships traffic 
through the canal (Cresta 2017). These flows originated 
from Southern Asia (India), Eastern Asia (China) and 
South-Eastern Asia (Singapore, Malaysia) and destined 
to the Mediterranean area and Northern Europe.
Speaking of origins/destinations and trade routes, it 
seems very interesting to analyse the characteristics of 
the commercial flows that have crossed the Suez Canal in 
recent years. The geographic interpretation of data allows 
us to highlight some useful observations (Figg. 8-9). In 
detail, we consider the cargo ton data by direction in the 
last ten years (2009-2018), mainly for two reasons:
• to verify the effect of global financial and economic 
crisis and its overcoming;
• to highlight the impact of the Suez Canal on the 
main East-West world routes.
North-South traffic has increased by 6,8% (this cate-
gory accounts for 51,0% of the overall traffic of goods in 
the canal during the period in exam). The traffic in the 
opposite direction registered a similar annual growth 
(+6,6%). Along the North-South direction of the canal, 
South East Asia is still the main destination for tran-
siting goods, accounting for 27,2% of the total (with an 
increase of 6,9% in 2009-2018). The Red Sea (26,3%) and 
the Arabian Gulf (19,2%) areas are relevant destinations 
of southbound flows. In particular the latter registered a 
significant +7,6% in 2009-2018.
In the opposite direction, the region of North West 
Europe holds the first place with a 32,6% share, followed 
by the East/South-east Mediterranean with a 23,5% 
share and by the North Mediterranean with a 19,9% 
share. The entire Mediterranean Sea stands for a 52,4% 
share. It is important to underline that flows destined to 
America are not residual (8,3%).
A look at the origin of goods reveals the dominant 
position of North West Europe along the North-South 
direction with its 24%, followed by the North Mediter-
ranean (17,6%) and the Black Sea (17,6%). The former has 
increased by 8,5% and the latter has arisen by 9,7%. The 
entire Mediterranean Sea stands for a 44,1% share.
In the opposite direction the South East Asia leads 
the ranking with 36,1% (with an increase by 8,3% in 
2009-2018), followed by the Gulf with 31,3% (with an 
increase by 11,5% in 2009-2018). Moreover, in this case 
the share of flows originated in America is significant 
and accounts for 8,2% (with an increase by 24,3% in 
2009-2018). All origins and destinations are character-
ized by positive trends (with the only exception of the 
Far East as origin of northbound traffic): this means a 
progressive recovery after the big fall in 2009. The flows 
data illustrated in figg. 8 and 9 highlight the strategic 
importance of the Suez Canal as an international hub 
along the global routes.
In this respect, Notteboom e Rodrigue (2011) point 
out that in the last few years new challenges arose for 
Figure 8. Growth of southbound cargo traffic through Suez by mar-
kets of origin and destination (annual average variation 2009-2018 
and total market share). Source: author’s elaboration of Suez Canal 
Authority data, various years.
Figure 9. Growth of northbound cargo traffic through Suez by mar-
kets of origin and destination (annual average variation 2009-2018 
and total market share). Source: author’s elaboration of Suez Canal 
Authority data, various years.
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the Suez Canal as an intersection of the traffics between 
East and West. The building of the new Canal allows 
faster transit times along the intercontinental East-West 
connection between Asia, the Middle East, Europe and 
the East coast of the United States (Baccelli et al. 2015).
In fact, we observe an increase in number of vessels 
passing through the Canal and above all in goods trans-
ported, further reinforcing the importance of Suez with-
in the geo-political panorama linked to international 
trade.
6. The role of the Suez Canal for the Mediterranean Sea
The Euro-Mediterranean’s most important geostra-
tegic point is for sure the Suez Canal (along with three 
natural straits: Gibraltar, Bosporus and Dardanelles). 
Indeed, it represents the shortest seaway from East Asia 
and the Middle East to Europe as well as for some Afri-
can states to Europe (Gaiser, Hribar 2012).
In order to understand the actual Mediterranean 
strategic relevance, it is important to look back in the 
last decades and consider the evolution of the global 
maritime traffic.
During the eighties and nineties the increase in 
international trade, accelerated by liberalization and 
opening of markets, has been the key driver of the 
expansion of containerization. In the late eighties, some 
countries such as the Asian Tigers began to emerge 
hence promoting the development of container traffic 
thanks to the type of production and the intensity of 
the flows. A model dominated by the old industrialized 
countries (North America, Japan, Western Europe) has 
undergone a transformation in a model that sees the 
ports with the largest share of container traffic mainly 
located in Asia (Guerrero, Rodrigue 2014).
In the nineties, a large increase of ships coming 
from Eastern Asia and directed to the US East coast 
significantly contributed to the saturation of the Pan-
ama Canal by encouraging the use of the Pendulum 
routes (Far East – Mediterranean and Northern Europe 
– North America) which, along the Suez-Gibraltar axis, 
provide a round and a return following the same route 
(Fig. 10). On these routes, the Far East is connected to 
the East Coast of the United States by crossing the Medi-
terranean (Amato, Galeota Lanza 2016).
As Foschi recalls (2003), in the eighties, the Medi-
terranean was considered a market apart that was sep-
arately connected to Asia, North America and Northern 
Europe. The liner shipping companies who normally 
worked on the main routes between the Far East and 
North America or Northern Europe also deployed ships 
dedicated specifically to services with the Mediterra-
nean. The physical routes and the organizational ineffi-
ciency or the excessive distance from the optimal route 
resulted in real physical-economic barriers for the big 
ships in transit (Foschi 2003).
The evolution in containerized cargo and its expo-
nential growth determined a radical change in one 
strategical area: the Mediterranean Sea. In fact, during 
the nineties, the biggest container shipping companies 
decided to incorporate the Mediterranean in the ocean-
ic routes, because of a number of contributory causes, 
intrinsic to the world linear shipping industry and inter-
national commerce (Foschi 2003; Landini 2017).
The global transformation of maritime container 
traffic was destined to produce significant effects on the 
southern Europe ports (Sellari 2014).
In 1995, the transpacific route ruled the market, 
controlling 53% of the global traffic, while the Europe–
Far East, which connected the European markets to the 
Chinese manufacturing sites through the Suez Canal 
and the Mediterranean, absorbed only 27% of the mar-
ket (Fardella, Prodi 2017).
Twenty-three years later, the distance between these 
two routes dropped in favour of the Europe–Far East 
one that today controls 41% of global traffic in the face 
of 46% of the transpacific route (UNCTAD 2018; Dean-
dreis 2018).
In 2018, the Far East-Europe was the second biggest 
trade lane (behind the transpacific), accounting for 25 
million of TEUs traffic. As a result of this growth, the 
Mediterranean basin and its ports recovered their own 
“centrality”, thanks to the transit of (almost) all mother 
vessels via the route Suez (Deandreis 2018). This new cen-
trality of the Mediterranean emerged due to the parallel 
impact of three concurrent factors (Fardella, Prodi 2017):
• the expansion of the Suez Canal in August 2015 that 
doubles the daily capacity of cargo transit, reducing 
Figure 10. The major East-West global container routes. Source: 
author’s elaboration.
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at the same time the waiting time and the transit 
costs;
• the emerging “naval gigantism” or the strategic use 
by the main shipping companies of huge vessels 
(between 13.000 and 22.000 TEUs) that can only be 
hosted by the Suez Canal1;
• the acceleration of global alliances made by shipping 
companies to strengthen their economies of scale.
These three concurrent phenomena are progressive-
ly reinforcing the competitive advantage of the Europe-
Far East route, making it even more convenient than the 
transpacific route for the Chinese cargo directed towards 
the North-Eastern coast of the USA. These processes 
provide the Mediterranean with an unprecedented “cen-
trality” within both of the China’s most important trade 
segments with Europe and the USA (Fardella, Prodi 
2017).
Because of this evolving scenario, the container traf-
fic in the Mediterranean has grown sixfold over the last 
20 years (+500%) and the top 30 Mediterranean ports 
have handled 53 million TEUs (this figure amounted to 
9 million in 1995) (SRM 2018).
More generally, it is important to underline that in 
the last years (between 2001 and 2018), the volume of 
freight traffic that crossed the Suez Canal jumped by 
164%, with the Mediterranean controlling almost 9% of 
the global trade.
This transformation, propelled by the epoch-mak-
ing growth of the Chinese market, seems to be having 
a virtuous impact on commercial, infrastructural and 
logistical dynamics in the Mediterranean. In 2001, the 
Mediterranean ports managed to attract a mere 34% 
of the goods that passed through the Suez Canal. All 
the rest left the Mare Nostrum through Gibraltar and 
was absorbed by Northern European ports such as Rot-
terdam and Hamburg (Fardella, Prodi 2017). Howev-
er, today (2018), 64% of the same traffic remains in the 
Mediterranean Sea.
7. The role of the Suez Canal for the North Italy ports: 
the case of Genoa
In literature arose the question of whether it is still 
necessary to identify sub-areas within the Mediterra-
nean or whether the global nature of maritime transport 
makes this distinction superfluous. Some peculiarities 
of these sub-regions suggest that it is still necessary for 
1 The Suez Canal has no restrictions on the passage of containerships 
(unlike Panama). Average vessel size via Suez reached 9.100 TEUs in 
September 2018; the highest value ever-achieved (SRM, Alex Bank 2018).
them to be treated as distinct areas, although on the 
way towards integration. By distinguishing these differ-
ent areas, it is possible to give a clearer analysis of the 
aspects that influence their development and of the crit-
ical factors to be taken into consideration in planning 
activities (Foschi 2003). In this paper, we are interested 
in a specific sub-area: the Northern Mediterranean.
As mentioned above, main cargo flows northbound/
southbound through the Suez Canal underline the 
importance of this zone. In particular, during the peri-
od of 2009-2018, the ports of this sub-area have a 17,6% 
share of the southbound traffic and a 19,9% share of the 
northbound traffic..
A typical characteristic of the Northern Mediter-
ranean is the presence of important gateway ports (Fig. 
11) (Notteboom 2009; 2010). These ports are nodes with 
a connected hinterland that is rich in production and 
consumption and constitute the international access/exit 
points for the regions supporting them (Foschi 2003).
If they have suitable physical, technical and infra-
structural characteristics, the large ocean-going ships 
with international traffic can call at these ports. Oth-
erwise, both on the East-West route and the North-
South route, they can serve small ocean ships perform-
ing regional and interregional cabotage services (short 
sea shipping) or carry out feeder services in a hub and 
spokes system (Foschi 2003).
In the Northern Mediterranean, the ports situated 
along the Tyrrhenian cost (Savona, Genoa, La Spezia and 
Leghorn) are predominantly involved in gateway functions 
(Portopia 2017) and form a multi-port gateway region (the 
so-called Ligurian Range) (Notteboom 2009; 2010).
Figure 11. The European container port system. Source: author’s 
elaboration of Notteboom 2009.
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Italy is one of the European countries that could 
benefits more from the new Suez Canal because of the 
strategic position at the centre of the Mediterranean 
and the growing importance of trade between the Far 
East and North America (Deandreis 2015). As shown in 
fig. 12, the main flows from Suez (or directed to) pass 
through the Sicily Strait but a part of them is attracted 
by the Northern Tyrrhenian ports.
In detail, these ports have some specific advantages 
(illustrated in fig. 11):
• savings of no less than five days in reaching the 
Northern range European ports for freight arriving 
from the East;
• configuration as the Southern terminals of Rhine-
Alps European corridor;
• potential customer base extending from Northern 
Italy to Switzerland, Austria and Bavaria.
On the other hand, it is necessary to consider some 
critical factors such as the difficulty of rail transit, the 
optimization of intermodal processes and the physical 
barrier constituted by the Alps (Foschi 2003). 
Anyway, in the last years, the Northern Italy ports 
(and the Ligurian ones in particular) are growing, the 
reform of ports governance has shown the first posi-
tive consequences and there is a renewed awareness of a 
potential key role for Italy in the new geo-economic sce-
nario (SRM 2018).
The final goal of this paper is to describe, as Pana-
ro suggested (2015), how the new infrastructure of the 
Suez Canal is considerable for the Northern Italy gate-
way ports.
As written above, typical gateway ports are points of 
entry or exit for continental markets and they are pref-
erably well-connected to large industrial and population 
centers. Mediterranean examples include the Northern 
Italy ports, which can be seen as a cluster of gateways 
(Wolters 2016).
The expanded Suez Canal can transport more ves-
sels, allow passage for larger megaships and reduce trip’s 
time and costs. These factors represent a new opportuni-
ty for global shipping ports, for the gateway ones in par-
ticular because of their connections with several inland 
logistics hub (Wolters 2016).
We focused our attention on the Genoa port, located 
in Northern Italy. It lies along a 22 km coastline, has 21 
private operating terminals, equipped to receive vessels 
for all types of goods: containerized cargo, perishable 
products, metals, forest products, dry bulk and oil prod-
ucts. The present structure has emerged in 1997 with 
the opening of a new western part, the Voltri Terminal 
Europa (VTE) dedicated to container handling.
Genoa is the first Italian container port in 2018 
(2,6 million of TEUs) and the second port for total car-
go (54,2 million of tons) behind Trieste (62,7 million of 
tons). It plays the role of a gateway port, as a terminal for 
import-export container flows serving the companies of 
North-Western Italy (Torbianelli, Borgogna 2012). Genoa 
is the greatest gateway port in Italy for deep-sea contain-
erized traffic (with direct connections), regarding both 
the number of monthly ship departures and the freight 
volumes (Lupi et al. 2019).
Deep-sea traffic originated from Asia and directed 
to Europe passes necessarily through the Suez Canal. 
Therefore, the Genoa port is the target of a large share 
traffic from Suez (Baccelli et al. 2015). In 2014 (the year 
before the Suez Canal doubling), the Genoa port had a 
7% of market share on the trade lane Far East-Mediter-
ranean and an average vessel capacity of 10.000 TEUs 
(ITF 2015).
In the last years, the growth of the Genoa port is an 
effect of the ever-greater importance taken by the Medi-
terranean in the global scenario of freight by sea. A rele-
vance that goes along with the increase in trades to and 
from the Far East, through the Suez Canal, whose dou-
bling (in August 2015) favoured this path (Corva 2019).
In this regard, the paper investigates the recent 
dynamics of the Genoa port using the traffic statistics in 
order to evaluate the role of goods flows passing through 
Suez.
The analysis of the freight flows from/to the Suez 
Canal in the last ten years (2009-2018) underlines some 
interesting facts (Table 1).
First of all, “the Suez’s share” accounts for 21,6% of 
total cargo traffic and for 47,5% of the containers han-
dled. Therefore, it looks definitely relevant.
In ten years, the Genoa port handled almost 108 
million tons of traffic passed through the Suez Canal. In 
Figure 12. The containership density and the main container ports 
in Italy. Source: Panaro, Ferrara 2018.
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detail, considering the typology of goods traded, con-
tainerized cargo represents 91,8% of total goods traded 
via Suez.
The evolution of total cargo traffic related to Suez 
registered an increase by 67,2% from 2009 to 2018.
Similarly, there was a significant boost in container 
traffic related to Suez (+54,7%) and an annual growth 
of 2,7% after the expansion of the Suez Canal (2015). In 
particular, the rise of freight flows concerns the years 
2009-2011 and 2013-2017. The data of 2018, on the other 
hand, fell by 5.5%.
In the period of 2009-2018 the Genoa container ter-
minals (VTE, Sech, Spinelli, Messina, San Giorgio) han-
dled a total of 9,4 million of TEUs passed through Suez.
Liquid bulk and conventional cargo shares are resid-
ual (respectively 3,3% and 3,1%). These have undergone a 
decrease in the last four years, even if in 2018 the trend 
switched to the opposite.
The analysis of the geographic distribution of the 
f lows allows to underline how the Far East’s traffic 
results to be prominent. In fact, it is possible to highlight 
that in the last ten years (2009-2018) the flows from/
to the Eastern Asia reached the 66% of the total traffic 
through Suez and, in particular, container flows repre-
sented the 68% of the total containerized cargo.
Therefore, the distribution of the major ports con-
nected with Genoa (cargo traffic and container) appears 
to be coherent with the data exposed above (Fig. 13). 
Indeed, they are mainly located in the Far East or in the 
Asian context (with the Middle East growing fast).
Conclusions
The expansion of the Canal will positively affect 
naval traffic and trade, representing an opportunity for 
enterprises and for shipping companies. The former will 
have a chance to count on more rapid freight flows and 
therefore on better processes of internationalization, the 
latter will be able to streamline routes and logistic sys-
tems (Baccelli et al. 2015).
In relative terms, the main beneficiaries will be 
long-range flows (China-Mediterranean-East Coast of 
the United States) of containerized cargo. All this will 
increase the centrality of the Mediterranean Sea and of 
the Northern Italy gateway ports.
Genoa is the main gateway port of Italy. The data 
illustrated in the previous paragraph show that the traf-
fic passing through the Suez Canal, in particular the 
Table 1. Genoa port: share of traffic (per type) coming from/directed to the Suez Canal (2009-2018). Source: author’s elaboration of data of 
the Port System Authority of Western Ligurian Sea, various years.
Container traffic Liquid bulk Conventional cargo Total cargo
tons % tons % tons % tons %
2009 7.408.440 48,8 552.890 2,7 268.953 3,7 8.230.283 17,7
2010 9.032.756 51,2 702.285 3,6 255.158 3,3 10.026.086 20,1
2011 9.650.797 51,0 793.458 4,4 229.201 2,9 10.711.951 21,6
2012 9.490.454 46,0 568.180 3,3 209.613 2,8 10.268.247 20,7
2013 8.524.206 44,0 774.956 4,6 298.052 3,9 9.632.954 20,1
2014 10.040.088 46,4 528.769 3,1 302.429 3,8 11.085.510 22,0
2015 10.598.395 48,5 546.434 3,5 279.342 3,4 11.724.651 23,7
2016 10.810.943 48,3 442.816 3,0 252.319 3,0 11.506.078 23,4
2017 12.124.247 47,0 330.052 2,2 179.807 2,0 12.634.106 23,6
2018 11.459.173 45,2 453.672 2,9 230.843 2,5 12.143.688 22,7
Total 99.139.499 47,5 5.693.512 3,3 2.505.717 3,1 107.963.554 21,6
Figure 13. Major ports connected with the Genoa port through the 
Suez Canal (cargo and container traffic). Source: author’s elaboration 
of Port System Authority of Western Ligurian Sea data, various years.
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container flows, is very significant for the Genoa port. 
In addition, the recent expansion of the canal has posi-
tively influenced the amount of freight handled in port. 
The growth in cargo traffic and forecasts of a further 
increase in the coming years are, at the least in part, due 
to the impact of the new Suez Canal.
Outlining the future scenario and development 
opportunities for Genoa seems inevitable to consider the 
current investment framework represented by the “Belt 
and Road Initiative” (BRI) launched in 2013 by China.
The BRI is an infrastructural investment program that 
aims to develop connectivity and collaboration between 
China and seventy countries, creating an integrated Eur-
asian economic area. Through transport corridors (by land 
and by sea), it will allow China to diversify trade routes 
and to intensify existing relations with the EU.
It should be highlighted that the choice of China 
is to orient part of the investments of the BRI program 
precisely on the maritime route that passes through the 
Suez Canal and Mediterranean.
In this regard, the key project for Genoa is the relo-
cation of the port breakwater included in the memoran-
dum signed in Rome by Chinese President Xi Jinping on 
23rd March 2019.
This realization would allow the port to host larger 
containerships (in line with the tendency to the naval 
gigantism described above), to increase the volume of 
containerized cargo handled and to improve its role of a 
gateway node.
This infrastructural option (supported by China) is 
the result of the recognition of Genoa as a terminal of 
the Silk Road for Western Europe (together with Trieste 
for Eastern Europe).
The choice of Beijing to focus on two Italian ports 
is based on economic, strategic and geographical evalu-
ations.
Considering the current distribution of freight in 
Europe as well as the growth of the route Europe-Far 
East via Suez, the position of the two Italian ports is 
strategic. In fact, both are connected with European 
Corridors: Genoa with the Rhine-Alps one and Trieste 
with the Baltic-Adriatic one (Romei 2017).
For these reason, the two ports are much closer to 
the center of Europe than other Italian ports but also 
European ports (in which China has already invested, 
see Greece with Piraeus and Spain with Valencia).
All with obvious geo-political effects facing the 
importance of the Chinese choice to aim at conquering 
the European market thanks to Genoa’s strategic posi-
tioning.
Therefore, the path of strengthening the China-Italy 
route via Genoa seems to be traced as well as the conse-
quent empowerment of the role of the Ligurian capital.
The future challenge for Genoa is to enhance its 
function as a gateway port to Central-western Europe by 
subtracting market shares to the North European ports.
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